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I.  Introduction 
During the process of setting up the African Union (AU) and the African Court of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACH)—which is on course to being transformed into the African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights (ACJH)1—the framers of these institutions’ constitutive in-
struments tried to learn from the best practices of the existing regional arrangements, such 
as the Inter-American and European human rights systems. Yet, more than ten years after 
the establishment of the AU, the organization continues to struggle with fully responding to 
human rights abuses in member states. Bogged down by technicalities, the ACH has not 
been able to tackle urgent human rights issues as it remains handicapped by instruments 
that do not allow it to proceed to the merits of most cases. The African Commission on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) remains largely insulated from the ACH be-
cause it has hardly taken advantage of the principle of complementarity with the latter. In 
the premises, this Article argues that on the whole, despite some notable achievements, the 
African human rights system remains inadequately equipped—from normative and proce-
dural standpoints—to more effectively protect human rights, and that a number of radical, 
far-reaching reforms or amendments are imperative in order to present a more consistent, 
effective and comprehensive human rights protection regime. These reforms include, but are 
not limited to, the elimination of the requirement that states submit a separate declaration 
that allows individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) access to the African 
courts, the merging of the African Commission with the ACH or ACJH, better financing of 
the African courts, expansion of the jurisdiction of an expanded African court, and amend-
ments to the African Charter to provide for a better normative framework. Unless the Afri-
can Union undertakes such radical changes, it will continue to engage in mere human rights 
rhetoric, which cannot constitute a genuinely new human rights dispensation or metamor-
phosis. 
Before the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was reconstituted as the AU, African 
States paid lip service to human rights issues. The establishment of the AU through the 
adoption of the Constitutive Act of the African Union2 (Constitutive Act) was a watershed 
moment that African States tried to seize upon to institutionalize and streamline human 
rights promotion and protection, and send a clear signal that the AU was making a radical 
departure from the past, characterized by utter disregard for human rights protection. Yet, 
the African human rights normative framework remained predominantly unchanged be-
 
 1. Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, adopted July 1, 2008 
[hereinafter ACJH Protocol/Statute], available at 
http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/PROTOCOL_STATUTE_AFRICAN_COURT_JUSTICE_AND_H
UMAN_RIGHTS.pdf.  
 2. Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted July 11, 2000, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15 (entered 
into force May 26, 2001) [hereinafter AU Constitutive Act]. 
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cause the primary instrument—the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights3 (Afri-
can Charter)—relates to an era when human rights were relegated to the periphery of Afri-
can States’ concerns.4 Some authors5 who have written on this subject in the past have 
stopped short of indicating specific provisions of the African Charter in need of reform. Fo-
cusing on, among others, the recent activity reports of the African Commission,6 this Article 
tries to indicate the difficulties that are already being experienced since the adoption of the 
Constitutive Act and the creation of the ACH. To these ends, Part I of this Article examines 
the revolutionary nature of the Constitutive Act, which by its terms introduced a reinvigor-
ated focus on human rights at the political level, giving rise to the establishment of judicial 
institutions for better protection of human rights, although the practical implementation has 
largely fallen short. Part II is a critical examination of the primary human rights instru-
ment—the African Charter—insofar as it stands in need of normative and procedural im-
provements. Part III is a critical evaluation of the constitutive instrument of the ACH and 
its jurisprudence and a discussion of the proposed ACJH. Part IV examines the need to 
transform the wider socio-economic and political context in which the human rights protec-
tion regime takes place. Part V presents recommendations and conclusions. 
II.  Constitutive Act of the African Union 
The Constitutive Act of the African Union represents a serious commitment to the pro-
motion and protection of human rights, at least in comparison to the Charter of the Organi-
zation of African Unity (OAU Charter). Under the OAU Charter, “the rights of the OAU 
Member States prevailed over those of their people.”7 Simply put, “[h]uman rights protection 
did not feature high on the agenda of the newly independent States.”8 The OAU Charter was 
preoccupied with “the rights to independent existence, self-determination and territorial in-
 
 3. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 
I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 23, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter].  
 4. See Dan Juma, Access to the African Court on Human and People’s Rights: A Case of the Poacher 
Turned Gamekeeper, ESSEX HUM. RTS. REV., Sept. 2007, at 1, (citing R. COHEN ET AL., HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA (1993)). 
 5. See e.g., Christof Heyns, The African Regional Human Rights System: In Need of Reform?, 1 AFR. 
HUM. RTS. L.J. 155, 159–73 (2001) (observing that the Charter system reform could take place in a 
number of ways: amendment of the Charter, the African Human rights Court protocol, and the 
rules of procedure; and at an informal level, it could involve changes in the practices of the African 
Commission on Human Rights). 
 6. See e.g., Activity Rep. of the Exec. Council of the African Comm’n on Hum. & Peoples’ Rights 
[ACHPR], 13th Ordinary Sess., June 24–28, 2008, Annex I & II, EX.CL/446(XIII), available at 
http://www.achpr.org/files/activity-reports/23/achpr4243eo4_actrep23_20072008_eng.pdf. 
 7. André Mbata B. Mangu, The Changing Human Rights Landscape in Africa: Organisation of Afri-
can Unity, African Union, New Partnership for Africa’s Development and the African Court, 23 
NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 379, 382 (2005). 
 8. Frans Viljoen & Evarist Baimu, Courts for Africa: Considering the Co-Existence of the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court of Justice, 22 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 241, 
245 (2004).  
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tegrity [which] are more State’s rights than human or peoples’ rights.”9 Indeed, the “OAU’s 
early practice demonstrates very little focus on human rights, which it considered to be mat-
ters that fall within the internal affairs of States.”10 In contrast, the Constitutive Act is an 
ambitious document because three of its fourteen objectives and six of its sixteen guiding 
principles focus on human rights. The overarching objective of the AU was to achieve a deci-
sive break from the past characterized by lackluster commitment to human rights, through 
the promotion of peace and security, democratic principles, economic and social development 
and the protection of human rights.11 To this end, the preamble of the Constitutive Act un-
ambiguously and boldly provides that the AU is “DETERMINED to promote and protect 
human and peoples’ rights.”12 Additionally, it provides that the African Union aims to “en-
courage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,”13 and to “promote and protect human and 
peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
other relevant human rights instruments.”14 It also provides that the African Union shall 
function, among other things, on the basis of “respect for democratic principles, human 
rights, the rule of law and good governance.”15 The Constitutive Act also provides that the 
AU shall promote gender equality,16 social justice to ensure balanced economic develop-
ment,17 respect for the sanctity of human life, the condemnation and rejection of impunity 
and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities,18 as well as condem-
nation and rejection of unconstitutional change of government.19 In fact, adopting a more 
muscular and aggressive approach to cases of grave violations of human rights, the amended 
Constitutive Act provides for the “right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursu-
ant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity.”20 At least on the books, this appears to be a radical 
departure from the rigid insistence on the principle of non-interference that was the center-
 
 9. Mangu, supra note 7, at 382.  
 10. Viljoen & Baimu, supra note 8, at 245.  
 11. See Anne Pieter van der Mei, The Ordeal of African Unity—Past, Present and Future of the African 
Union (Maastricht Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 5, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1345732. 
 12. AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, pmbl. 
 13. Id. art. 3(e). 
 14. Id. art. 3(h).  
 15. Id. art. 4(m). 
 16. Id. art. 4(l). 
 17. Id. art. 4(n).  
 18. AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 4(o).  
 19. Id. art. 4(p). 
 20. Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4(h), adopted July 11, 
2003, available at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/PROTOCOL_AMENDMENTS_CONSTITUTIVE_ACT_OF_
THE_AFRICAN_UNION.pdf. 
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piece of the OAU Charter.21 This principle “contributed to the reluctance of Member States 
to seriously pursue human rights promotion and enforcement [in the face of] a persistent 
unwillingness among member states to criticize one another in the face of flagrant human 
rights abuse.”22 In this sense, the Constitutive Act tries to establish a new human rights 
paradigm and culture of promotion and respect for human rights. But the proof of the pud-
ding is in the eating; so was the emphasis on human rights in the Constitutive Act more on 
rhetoric but less on substance? 
It has been noted that the progressive provisions of the Constitutive Act are only as good 
as the AU member states are willing to act upon them.23 Certainly, from a normative stand-
point the Constitutive Act inspired the adoption of a plethora of new human rights instru-
ments that sought to broaden the scope of human rights protected under the African human 
rights system. For example, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa24 explicitly indicates that it affirms “the principle of 
promoting gender equality as enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union.”25 The 
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance also indicates that it is inspired 
and premised on the Constitutive Act, to the extent that it indicates that it is “[i]nspired by 
the objectives and principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union, particu-
larly Articles 3 and 4, which emphasise the significance of good governance, popular partici-
pation, the rule of law and human rights.”26 The African Union can be commended for taking 
a more serious and determined stand on human rights violations, especially with regard to 
violations of democracy.27 But it has been noted that these changes at least “reflect a radical 
 
21. Charter of the Organization of African Unity art. III(2), done May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39 [here-
inafter OAU Charter], available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/OAU_Charter_1963.pdf; 
see also Nsongurua J. Udombana, Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better 
Late Than Never, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 45, 56 (2000) (observing that the principle of non-
interference was “a foundation stone of the [OAU], a rule regarded as sacrosanct, to which States 
have rigidly adhered.”). 
 22. Udombana, supra note 21, at 56.  
 23. Mangu, supra note 7, at 386 (“AU intervention in case of gross human rights violations will depend 
on a decision of the (AU) Peace and Security Council, . . . the political will of many African leaders 
within the AU, the existence of a well-trained and equipped African army, the willingness of AU 
Member States to contribute troops, and the importance of financial and material resources at the 
disposal of the AU to perform its mission.”). 
24. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 
adopted July 11, 2003 [hereinafter Protocol on Women’s Rights], available at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol%20on%20the%20Rights%20of%20Women.pdf.  
 25. See id. pmbl. 




 27. See Mangu, supra note 7, at 387 (noting that “the debate about human rights in Zimbabwe during 
the 2004 AU summit sent a strong message that there would be little tolerance this time around 
and African leaders were no longer so enthusiastic about turning a blind eye or a deaf ear to the 
cries of the victims of human rights violations on the continent,” and that “[t]he AU also took a 
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shift in their attitude and language.”28 Without the Constitutive Act, the Protocol on the Es-
tablishment of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACH Protocol) and the Pro-
tocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJH Proto-
col/Statute) would have been inconceivable based on the existing framework.29 The ACJH 
Protocol/Statute is premised on the recognition “that the Constitutive Act of the African Un-
ion provides for the establishment of a Court of Justice charged with hearing, among other 
things, all cases relating to interpretation or application of the said Act or of all other Trea-
ties adopted within the framework of the Union.”30 In fact, Konstantinos D. Magliveras and 
Gino J. Naldi observe that the establishment of the African Court of Justice (AU Court) (by 
Article 18 of the Constitutive Act) as the principal judicial organ of the AU signaled a wel-
come departure from the OAU.31 These authors also indicate that “[t]he AU makes plain its 
break with the past by considering that the AU Court has an essential role to play in helping 
achieve its objectives.”32 
It has been noted, however, that the Constitutive Act offers “few possibilities to ensure 
conformity with the norms set out in the Act,”33 and that “unlike the UN Charter, the Act 
does not provide for expulsion of a member State that persistently violates the principles, 
including the human rights principles, set out in the Act.”34 The AU has been willing to en-
gage in human rights rhetoric and platitudes, but it has been less decisive in following up 
with concrete action. The AU’s commitment has been tested in a few areas such as its re-
sponse to the disputed elections in Zimbabwe and Kenya, as well as its response to situa-
tions of grave violations of human rights such as Darfur, Sudan and Libya. It has been noted 
that “violations of human rights, constitutionalism, and democracy in Zimbabwe and other 
African countries were not met by African leaders with the same condemnation and rejection 
as they did [in] Togo,”35 Guinea-Bissau, and Mali. 
 
proactive approach by sending an observation mission in the Sudanese province of Darfur where 
militia allied with the Khartoum Government were accused of grave human rights violations, in-
cluding genocide” and that in “[d]ealing with unconstitutional changes of government in Africa, the 
AU should be commended for the position adopted by its Member States vis-à-vis the . . . coup 
d’état in Togo.”). Also, in April 2010, Guinea-Bissau’s military took control of the country in a coup 
d’état. In response, the AU suspended Guinea-Bissau from the AU until constitutional order could 
be restored. Again, in response to the military coup in Mali in March 2012, the AU swiftly re-
sponded by suspending Mali from the AU. 
 28. Fatsah Ouguergouz, The Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Ju-
dicial Premiere for the African Union, 11 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 79, 81 (2003). 
 29. ACJH Protocol/Statute supra note 1. This statute has not yet entered into force. As of September 3, 
2012, only five countries had ratified it. Article 9(1) of this protocol provides that the protocol and 
the statute annexed to it will come into force after the deposit of fifteen instruments of ratification.  
 30. ACJH Protocol/Statute supra note 1, pmbl. 
 31. Konstantinos D. Magliveras & Gino J. Naldi, The African Court of Justice, 66 HEIDELBERG J. OF 
INT’L L. 187, 188 (2006). 
 32. Id. at 189. 
 33. Viljoen & Baimu, supra note 8, at 248–49.  
 34. Id. at 249.  
 35. Mangu, supra note 7, at 388. 
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III. The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
A. Normative Inadequacies  
Although the “Charter and its Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, the OAU Refu-
gee Convention and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child constitute 
the African regional human rights system,”36 this Section will focus on the African Charter. 
The African Charter is presupposed to be the primary and most comprehensive human 
rights instrument of the Constitutive Act, but this foundational instrument is insufficiently 
synchronized with the Constitutive Act’s more progressive objectives. The African Charter 
was forged in the light of OAU political37 realities in Africa that constrained or limited the 
scope of norms that were articulated therein. Most African states at the time of the adoption 
of the African Charter were either authoritarian or had infant democracies.38 The adoption 
of the African Charter was important in three ways. “First, it was thought that the existence 
of geographic, political, social, historical and cultural affinities among states of a particular 
region” was a good foundation on which human rights could be nurtured and enforced.39 Se-
cond, the regional human rights instruments were to represent a consensus on the human 
rights norms in Africa.40 Last, it was hoped that the human rights system would legitimize 
 
 36. Viljoen & Baimu, supra note 8, at 246.  
 37. In 1979, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government met in Monrovia, Liberia, and adopted a 
decision requesting the General Secretariat to draft a Charter on human and peoples’ rights. At 
the meeting of experts to draft the Charter in December in Dakar, Senegal, President Senghor of 
Senegal reminded the experts to “keep constantly in mind our values of civilisation and the real 
needs of Africa.” Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, Implementing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights un-
der the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND 
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, 1986–2000, at 178, 187 (Malcom D. Evans & Rachel 
Murray eds., 2002). However, while they had before them treaties from the U.N., Europe, and 
America, they decided to take a separate course on many issues because they felt their African 
values, political realities, traditions and culture required such a deviation. The OAU Charter made 
little reference to human rights despite the endorsement of the principles enshrined in the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights in the preamble. Many years later, the African leaders enacted 
the Constitutive Act, this time trying to emulate the European Union and other parts of the world 
and suggesting that they were determined to “promote and protect human and peoples’ rights, con-
solidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law.” 
AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, pmbl. The Constitutive Act puts human rights at the center. 
See id. arts. 3, 4. Article 3 of the Constitutive Act states that the African Union’s objectives include 
to “[p]romote and protect human and people’s right in accordance with the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.” Id. art. 3. However, the African Charter had different objectives—
predominantly to promote self-determination of emerging African States and not to promote the 
rights of citizens in those countries. 
 38. See Juma, supra note 4, at 1. 
 39. Dan Juma, Lost, (or Found) in Transition? The Anatomy of the New African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, 13 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 267, 271 (2009). 
 40. Id. at 272 (citing B. H. Weston et al., Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and Ap-
praisal, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 587, 589 (1987)).  
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“the human rights language” in Africa.41 Those objectives do not have particular resonance 
with the Constitutive Act. 
The core problem is that “despite the fact that the Charter will gain [a] more important 
role in enforcing rights across the continent due to the [African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights], the Charter itself is a weak document.”42 Merely strengthening the enforcement 
mechanisms is insufficient, as this effort must be “accompanied by a radical revision of the 
provisions of the African Charter.”43 So far, the African Union has focused on restructuring 
the enforcement mechanisms—notably by establishing African courts—without tackling an 
equally important problem—the weaknesses within the African Charter. This approach can 
only lead to limited improvements in the protection of human rights. 
The African Charter’s substantive rights provisions need reform in a number of respects. 
For example, Article 4 provides that “[h]uman beings are inviolable. Every human being 
shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbi-
trarily deprived of this right.”44 But the African Charter does not elaborate the scope or con-
tent of the right to life. For example, it is not clear what “human being” means. With respect 
to freedom of expression or speech, the African Charter, unlike other comparable interna-
tional human rights instruments, does not define the individual’s right to information and 
his or her right to freely express and disseminate his or her opinions.45 While the Constitu-
tive Act aims to promote greater commitment to democracy, the existing provisions of the 
African Charter relate to a different and more repressive dispensation. Article 11 of the Afri-
can Charter provides for the right to freedom of assembly.46 Freedom of association cannot 
be dissociated from freedom of assembly. Without regular gatherings, the members of an as-
sociation cannot have an effective existence. Hence, freedom of assembly belongs to the 
bunch of rights indispensable to democracy. However, compared to Article 21 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights47 and comparable provisions of the American 
 
 41. Id. (citing INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 792 (Henry J. 
Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 2d ed. 2000)). 
 42. Elise G. Nalbandian, The Challenges Facing African Court of Human And Peoples’ Rights, 1 MIZAN 
L. REV. 75, 78 (2007). 
 43. Andreas O’Shea, A Critical Reflection on the Proposed African Court on Human and 
 Peoples’ Rights, 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 285, 290 (2001). 
 44. African Charter, supra note 3, art. 4. 
 45. Id. art. 9. 
 46. Id. art. 11 (“Every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others. The exercise of 
this right shall be subject only to necessary restrictions provided for by law in particular those en-
acted in the interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of oth-
ers.”).  
 47. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 21, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Annex, U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. No. 16 at 55, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 19, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“The 
right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this 
right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protec-
tion of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” (emphasis 
added)). 
11 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 267 (2013) 
276 
(Article 15)48 and European human rights instruments (Article 11),49 the African Charter’s 
corresponding provision does not specifically refer to the concept of “democratic society.” This 
is a serious omission because the concept introduces the requirement of proportionality re-
garding any restrictive measures that the state may impose on the right to freedoms of as-
sembly and association and their intended purposes.  
The African Charter provides that   
 The Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human and peo-
ples’ rights, particularly from the . . . Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other 
instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African countries in the field of 
human and peoples’ rights . . . of which the parties to the present Charter are mem-
bers.50  
However, “inspiration” does not necessarily mean that the African Commission is bound to 
apply “other instruments” in case these conflict with the African Charter. 
Moreover, as if the normative inadequacies are not enough, what the African Charter 
gives with one hand, it takes away with the other because of its sweeping or overbroad limi-
tation clauses or “claw-back” clauses juxtaposed against almost every normative provision.51 
The “claw-back” provisions have “overwhelmed the integrity of the rights.”52 The “claw-back” 
clauses include “clauses like ‘except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law,’ 
‘subject to law and order,’ ‘within the law,’ ‘abides by the law,’ ‘in accordance with the provi-
sions of the law,’ and other restrictions justified for the ‘protection of national security.’ ”53 
These provisions allow African states and governments to restrict basic human rights and 
 
 48. American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San Jośe, Costa Rica,” art. 15, Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (“The right of peaceful assembly, without arms, is recognized. 
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity 
with the law and necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national security, public safety 
or public order, or to protect public health or morals or the rights or freedom of others.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 49. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 11(2), concluded 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (“No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other 
than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of na-
tional security or public safety . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 50. African Charter, supra note 3, art. 60. 
 51. See, e.g., id. art. 14 (providing in one part that: “The right to property shall be guaranteed.”). This 
right is limited extensively by the second part of the article which provides: “It may only be en-
croached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in ac-
cordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.” Id. The limitation here is seen in the fact that 
the African Charter makes no reference to a “democratic society” and the laws by which individual 
property rights may be denied might as well come from an authoritarian or military regime. 
 52. Awol Kassim Allo, Derogations or Limitations? Rethinking the African Human Rights System of 
Derogation in Light of the European System, 2 ETHIOPIAN J. LEGAL EDUC. 21, 37–38 (2009). 
 53. Makau Matua, The African Human Rights Court: A Two-Legged Stool?, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 342, 358 
(1999) (citing Makau wa Mutua, African Renaissance, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1991, at L23). 
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freedoms to the extent allowed by their various national laws.54 Interpreting the “claw-back” 
provisions this way to restrict human rights to the extent allowed under domestic laws ren-
ders “the utility of the Charter as an instrument of international supervi-
sion . . . questionable.”55 
The preceding paragraph makes it apparent that the African Charter is broad in terms of 
its material jurisdiction or jurisdiction ratione materiae. It tries to import by reference cer-
tain norms of international human rights instruments.56 Commenters identified it as a po-
tentially good thing from a remedial standpoint in terms of making up for what is lacking in 
the African Charter. For example, it is argued that if a “state party to the African Charter 
tried to invoke a claw-back clause to justify a breach of internationally protected 
rights . . . [t]he victim could simply invoke a treaty protecting the same rights, such as the 
ICCPR, that did not include a similar claw-back clause.”57 But, based on the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), the African Charter cannot be amended by implica-
tion,58 especially in cases of explicit conflict with other international human rights instru-
ments. In fact, any attempt to make other treaties applicable risks rendering the African 
Charter inapplicable because according to the VCLT, “[w]hen a treaty specifies that it is sub-
ject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the 
provisions of that other treaty prevail.”59 In any case, according to the lex specialis derogat 
legi generali rule of interpretation, if there are two rules that bind the same subject matter, 
the more specific rule prevails over the more general rule.60 This would probably be the case 
where the African Charter specifically makes human rights subject to the provisions of na-
tional law. In any case, the use of such norms in other instruments, even if applicable, is lim-
ited to providing inspiration, and to that extent is a subsidiary means, which means those 
 
 54. See Makau Matua, The Construction of the African Human Rights System: Prospects and Pitfalls, 
in REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING FROM INSPIRATION TO IMPACT 143, 146 (Samantha Power & 
Graham Allison eds., 2000). 
 55. See Allo, supra note 52, at 37–38.  
 56. See African Charter, supra note 3, art. 60. Indeed, the provision has been extended to the African 
Court of Human Rights in certain respects by Article 3(1) of the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court of Human Rights (ACH Pro-
tocol), art. 3(1), adopted June 9, 1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) [hereinafter 
ACH Protocol], available at http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/court-
establishment/achpr_instr_proto_court_eng.pdf (“The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all 
cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, 
this Protocol and any other relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States concerned.”). 
 57. Robert Wundeh Eno, The Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2 AFR. 
HUM. RTS. L.J. 223, 227 (2002). 
 58. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 40, done May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [herein-
after VCLT]. 
 59. Id. art. 30(2). 
 60. For application between different instruments, see Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, (Greece v. 
U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 31 (Aug. 30). 
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sources do not provide legally binding rules in the African context.61 This appears to be the 
sense in which the African Commission has been citing to decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights, among others.62 In Chinhamo, for example, the African Commission cited 
Countess Spencer v. United Kingdom, a case from the European Commission on Human 
Rights.63 In fact, the African Commission invoked Article 6064 of the African Charter to use 
civil rights decisions of the United States of America. In Institute for Human Rights and De-
velopment in Africa v. Republic of Angola, the Commission noted that “[i]n terms of Article 
60 of the Charter, this Commission can also be inspired in this regard by the famous case of 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.”65 But these references can, at best, provide persua-
sive authority. 
B. Procedural and Institutional Inadequacies 
One scholar noted that “[a]lthough the African Charter makes a significant contribution 
to the human rights corpus, it creates an ineffectual enforcement system.”66 The African 
Charter created an enforcement body—the African Commission—that can bark but not bite. 
Thus, the African Commission has been described as “a mixture of impotence, incompetence, 
ponderous irrelevance and even lack of independence bordering on complicity in the viola-
 
 61. See African Charter, supra note 3, art. 61 (“The Commission shall also take into consideration, as 
subsidiary measures to determine the principles of law, other general or special international con-
ventions, laying down rules expressly recognized by Member States of the Organization of African 
Unity, African practices consistent with international norms on Human and Peoples’ Rights, cus-
toms generally accepted as law, general principles of law recognized by African States as well as 
legal precedents and doctrine.” (emphasis added)). 
 62. The African Commission has made reference to jurisprudence and documents of other internation-
al bodies, such as the U.N. Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights. 
The Commission has also used international law in its decisions. The African Commission refers to 
decisions and jurisprudence from other international and regional bodies; the African Commission 
even finds violations of other international instruments. See Malawi African Ass’n v. Mauritania, 
Decision, Comm. No. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97, 196/97, 210/98, 13th ACHPR AAR Annex V 
(1999–2000), available at 
http://www.worldcourts.com/achpr/eng/decisions/2000.05.11_Malawi_African_Association_v_Mauri
tania.htm. See also the recent decisions in Inst. for Human Rights & Dev. in Africa v. Republic of 
Angola, Decision, Comm. No. 292/04 IHRDA 24th AAR (2004), available at 
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/43rd/comunications/292.04/achpr43_292_04_eng.pdf; Obert 
Chinhamo v. Republic of Zimbabwe, Comm. No. 307/05, 23d ACHPR AAR (2007), available at 
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/42nd/comunications/307.05/achpr42_307_05_eng.pdf. 
 63. See Chinhamo, Comm. No. 307/05, 23d ACHPR AAR, at ¶ 85. 
 64. See African Charter, supra note 3, art. 60 (“The Commission shall draw inspiration from interna-
tional law on human and peoples’ rights, particularly from the provisions of various African in-
struments on human and peoples’ rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Or-
ganization of African Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other instruments 
adopted by the United Nations and by African countries in the field of human and peoples’ rights 
as well as from the provisions of various instruments adopted within the Specialized Agencies of 
the United Nations of which the parties to the present Charter are members.”). 
 65. Inst. for Human Rights & Dev. in Africa, Comm. No. 292/04 IHRDA 24th AAR, ¶ 46. 
 66. Matua, supra note 53, at 343.  
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tion of human rights in Africa.”67 But this is because the African Commission did not have 
any enforcement powers, it was “not empowered to condemn an offending State,” it could on-
ly make recommendations to states parties, and so there was blatant disregard of the Com-
mission’s recommendations, orders, and pronouncements by member states.68 The case that 
epitomizes this situation is International PEN ex rel. Ken Saro-Wiwa v. Nigeria.69 Ken Saro-
Wiwa, a Nigerian environmentalist and leader of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogo-
ni Peoples, along with eight of his associates, were sentenced to death by a Special Tribunal 
for Civil Disturbances. The African Commission immediately issued provisional measures, 
which the Nigerian government blatantly ignored, following through on the execution of the-
se activists. Weakened by lack of compliance, the African Commission has had very few peti-
tions that resulted in adverse judgments, and a vast majority of them were disposed of as 
inadmissible,70 withdrawn, or concluded through friendly settlement. Even then, it would be 
wrong  
to argue that the African Commission did not achieve anything. Despite odds and the 
problem of the enforcement of its decisions which was left to the OAU Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government, the Commission contributed to paving the way for a 
better protection of human and peoples’ rights.71 
But there are further issues relating to procedure in the African Charter that need atten-
tion. The African Charter needs to provide clearer steps with regard to exhaustion of domes-
tic remedies. For example, it provides that the Commission can take up matters after the 
exhaustion of local remedies, unless doing so would be unduly prolonged.72 Although it 
makes reference to three months as the time period communication between two states, the 
African Charter does not specify what constitutes an “unduly prolonged” period of time. 
What this means is that the enforcement bodies have to look to other human rights institu-
tions such as the Inter-American and European institutions for indications as to what “rea-
sonable” time could mean.73 The African Commission in Mouvement Burkinabe des Droits de 
 
 67. Mangu, supra note 7, at 384. 
 68. Udombana, supra note 21, at 67. 
 69. Int’l Pen v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 137/94, 139/94, 154/96, 161/97 12th ACHPR AAR Annex V (Oct. 
31, 1998), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/137-94_139-94_154-
96_161-97.html. 
 70. For example, a quick review indicates that of 156 petitions before the African Commission, eighty-
two were ruled inadmissible and seventy-four were decided on merits. See African Human Rights: 
Case Law Analyser, INST. FOR HUM. RTS. & DEV. IN AFRICA (IHRDA), 
http://caselaw.ihrda.org/acmhpr/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
 71. Mangu, supra note 7, at 384.  
 72. See African Charter, supra note 3, arts. 47–50. 
 73. See, e.g., Obert Chinhamo v. Republic of Zimbabwe, Comm. No. 307/05, 23d ACHPR AAR, ¶ 89 
(2007), available at 
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/42nd/comunications/307.05/achpr42_307_05_eng.pdf (African 
Commission expressing hesitancy as to whether it should follow the practice of other human rights 
bodies in this respect: “Even if the Commission were to adopt the practice of other regional bodies 
to consider six months as the reasonable period to submit complaints . . . .”). 
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l’Homme et des Peuples v. Burkina Faso dealt with the right to a hearing within a reasona-
ble time.74 The Commission found that the failure of Burkina Faso’s Supreme Court to make 
a decision within fifteen years on the complainant Halidou Ouedrago’s human rights abuses 
by the Burkina Faso government amounted to a denial of justice and a violation of an impar-
tial trial within a reasonable time.75 However, there were no precise criteria that the African 
Commission could rely on in regard to what amounted to “unreasonable” time.76 
Regarding admissibility, Article 56(2) of the African Charter provides that a communica-
tion or petition must comply with the OAU Charter and/or African Charter. However, the 
Constitutive Act replaces the OAU Charter. The African Commission confronted this issue 
in Obert Chinhamo v. Republic of Zimbabwe.77 The African Commission had to interpret the 
provisions of Article 56(2) of the African Charter which provides that a communication is not 
admissible if it is incompatible with the African Charter and/or the Charter of the OAU. The 
African Commission resolved this by treating the AU as if it were the equivalent of the OAU. 
A potentially important mechanism for human rights protection is the requirement of bi-
annual state reports to the Africa Commission. Article 62 of the African Charter provides 
that “[e]ach State Party shall undertake to submit every two years, from the date the pre-
sent Charter comes into force, a report on the legislative or other measures taken with a 
view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed by the present 
Charter.”78 However, most states have not taken seriously their reporting obligations, and 
the African Charter does not provide for any consequences in cases of such failure. In one of 
its activity reports, the African Commission indicated that as of 2008, only fifteen of the fif-
ty-three African States had submitted all of their reports.79 However, even the observations 
and recommendations of the African Commission with regard to those few reports do not 
have any significant impact on those states.80 
The African Commission’s work has further been hampered by the confidentiality and 
lack of transparency provisions of the African Charter. The African Charter provides that 
“[a]ll measures taken within the provisions of the present Chapter shall remain confidential 
 
 74. Mouvement Burkinabé v. Burkina Faso, Comm. No. 204/97, 14th ACHPR AAR (2001), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/204-97.html. See also Robert P. Barnidge Jr., The 
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights: Addressing the Right to an Impartial Hearing on Detention and Trial within a Rea-
sonable Time and the Presumption of Innocence, 4 AFRICAN HUM. RTS L.J. 108, 112–13 (2004). 
 75. Mouvement Burkinabé, Comm. No. 204/97, 14th ACHPR AAR. 
 76. See African Charter, supra note 3, art. 7(1)(d). 
 77. Chinhamo, Comm. No. 307/05, 23d ACHPR AAR. 
 78. See African Charter, supra note 3, art. 62. 
 79. Those states include: Algeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Egypt, Kenya, Libya, Maurita-
nia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. For a cri-
tique of the procedures relating to state reports, see generally Frans Viljoen, Examination of State 
Report at the 27th Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Critical 
Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 16 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 576 (2000).  
 80. Matua, supra note 53, at 350. 
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until such a time as the Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall otherwise de-
cide.”81 The implication of this is that “the decision on whether to publicize a human rights 
violation on the part of an African State is reserved to the discretion of her sister States.”82 
The African Commission cannot publish its findings until they are confirmed by the African 
Heads of State. As a result, little was known about the African Commission’s work on trage-
dies in Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Kenya and 
Zimbabwe. Yet, in the realm of human rights enforcement, public naming and shaming can 
be a crucially effective implementation tool. In light of these weaknesses, the need for more 
effective enforcement mechanisms was glaring in the wake of the establishment of the Afri-
can Union. The most important product of this effort has been the establishment of the 
ACH, slated to become the ACJH. 
IV.  The African Human Rights Courts 
A. African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Milestone 
The creation of the ACH heralded a new era in human rights enforcement.83 The African 
Charter originally provided only for the African Commission, which would deliver legally 
non-binding views or recommendations on communications or petitions. It never provided 
for a judicial institution with the ability to render binding judgments. The functions of the 
African Commission were primarily “promotional and protective.”84 Specifically, the African 
Commission has three main functions—“examining state reports, considering communica-
tions . . . , and expounding the African Charter.”85 
These weaknesses and shortcomings of the African Commission led to the adoption of 
Resolution on the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in June 1996 by the 
OAU Assembly of Heads of States and Governments, which requested the OAU Secretary 
General to convene a meeting of government experts to examine the efficiency of the African 
Commission with a view to improving it.86 The result was the continued operation of the Af-
rican Commission, and the creation of the ACH, with the intention that the institutions 
would complement each other. Article 2 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and People’s 
 
 81. See African Charter, supra note 3, art. 59(1) (emphasis added). 
 82. Udombana, supra note 21, at 69.  
 83. See ACH Protocol, supra note 56, art. 4. 
 84. Mutua, supra note 53, at 345. 
 85. Id. (citing the various applicable African Charter articles) (footnotes omitted). 
 86. Resolution on the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 30th Ord. Sess., June 13–
15, 1994, Doc. AHG/Res.260 (XXX), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/resafchar30th.html.  
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Rights (ACH Protocol) provides that the court “shall complement the protective mandate of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Right.”87 
But this complementarity does not seem to be working as envisaged. There is need to 
make it mandatory that if, after a certain period, a state party has not complied with a rec-
ommendation of the African Commission, the African Commission automatically refers the 
case to the ACH (or the planned ACJH). So far the rules of the African Commission are op-
tional or discretionary on this point. Some commentators have noted that it is not clear 
whether the African Commission has a legal obligation to refer cases to the ACH and at 
what stage the cases may be referred.88 According to Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz, the 
“travaux préparatoires of the Protocol show that it was originally planned to include all pro-
ceedings before the Court in the immediate extension of those brought before the Commis-
sion, but that this idea was subsequently abandoned.”89 The rule states that  
 If the Commission has taken a decision with respect to a communication submitted 
under . . . the Charter and considers that the State has not complied or is unwilling to 
comply with its recommendations . . . , it may submit the communication to the Court 
pursuant to Article 5(1)(a) of the Protocol . . . .90  
This is not only helpful as it indicates that the African Commission is complementary to 
the ACH but only if it so chooses, which can have a negative effect on complementarity,91 
and yet the principal reason for the establishment of the African Court of Human Rights 
was to “enhance the efficiency of the protective mandate under the African Charter”92 rela-
tive to the African Commission. If this rule were not discretionary but mandatory, it would 
help fill the lacuna left in place by the fact that some states have been reluctant to make the 
declaration that grants individuals direct access to the ACH.93 Individuals may be less will-
ing to submit their petitions to the African Commission, and yet this “could relieve pressure 
on the court if the Commission forwards only cases with a certain likelihood of success.”94 In 
this respect, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is instructive, because its 
 
 87. ACH Protocol, supra note 56, art. 2. 
 88. Juma, supra note 4, at 8.  
 89. Ouguergouz, supra note 28, at 108.  
 90. Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, R. 118(1) (2010) 
[hereinafter African Commission Rules of Procedure], available at 
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/rules-of-procedure-2010/rules_of_procedure_2010_en.pdf 
(emphasis added). 
 91. See Nalbandian, supra note 42, at 87 n.63, 88 (arguing that if the African Commission chose to 
“broadly interpret[] its discretion as to which cases to submit,” “very few cases may be sent on to 
the Court by the Commission which will in effect mean that the Court will hear a small number of 
cases at best, or more likely, none at all”). 
 92. Ibrahim Ali Badawi Elsheikh, The Future Relationship between the African Court and the African 
Commission, 2 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 252, 256 (2002). 
 93. Andreas Zimmermann & Jelena Bäumler, Current Challenges Facing the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, 7 KAS INT’L REP. 38, 44 (2010), available at 
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_20018-544-2-30.pdf?100630122123.  
 94. Id. 
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rules mandatorily provide that if “the Commission considers that the State has not complied 
with the recommendations of the report approved in accordance with Article 50 of the Amer-
ican Convention, it shall refer the case to the Court.”95 At the very least, the African Com-
mission should be required to inform the African Court in cases in which it decides not to 
refer such cases to the African Court. For example, the rules of the European Commission of 
Human Rights—which was later amalgamated with the European Court of Human 
Rights—provided that “[w]here the Commission decides not to bring the case before the 
Court, it shall so inform the Court, the Committee of Ministers and the parties to the appli-
cation.”96 Be that as it may, the European human rights systems ultimately abandoned that 
mechanism and the Inter-American system requires the Commission to refer all cases of 
non-compliance to the court. 
As one scholar points out, “[i]t took another twenty years after the adoption of the OAU 
Charter to establish an explicit human rights instrument for the region” in the form of the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights in 1981.97 The greatest weakness of this in-
strument “was its failure to provide for an institutional safeguard in the form of a judicial 
organ in the African system.”98 It took almost another twenty years for the African Union to 
create a judicial institution for the enforcement of human rights. In light of this, it would be 
expected that African leaders would seize this opportunity to seriously commit themselves to 
allowing their citizens to have ready access to that judicial institution. However, the ACH 
Protocol provides for only limited numbers of entities and individuals that could direct legal 
standing before the ACH. Article 5 of the ACH Protocol provides that the following entities 
have access to this ACH: the African Commission, the state party which has lodged a com-
plaint to the Commission, the state party against which the complaint has been lodged at 
the Commission; the state party whose citizen is a victim of human rights violation, and Af-
rican Inter-governmental organizations.99 In fact, the ACH is also granted further discretion 
as to whether to allow an individual or NGO to institute a case directly. According to the 
ACH Protocol, this “Court may entitle relevant Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
with observer status before the Commission, and individuals to institute cases directly be-
fore it, in accordance with Article 34(6) of this Protocol.”100 The requirement of Article 5(3) 
read in conjunction with Article 34(6) of the ACH Protocol is this: a state must make an op-
tional declaration before its citizens can individually and directly institute cases before the 
 
 95. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, R. 45(1) (2011) available 
at 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/22.RULES%20OF%20PROCEDURE%20IA%20COM
MISSION.pdf (emphasis added). 
 96. Rules of Procedure of the European Commission of Human Rights, R. 61(3) (1993), available at 
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/Eur_Commission/commrules.html. 
 97. Udombana, supra note 21, at 58. 
 98. Id. at 63. 
 99. See ACH Protocol, supra note 56, art. 5(1).  
 100. Id. art. 5(3) (emphasis added). 
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ACH. According to Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz of the ACH, this means the “Court’s jurisdic-
tion is not automatic and that bringing a case before it depends upon its discretionary pow-
er.”101 The restriction of access to the ACH “defies the primary raison d’être of international 
human rights law,”102 which is to protect the individual or group from the state. It really 
amounts to relying on the “state to institute cases . . . . [A] case of the poacher turned game-
keeper.”103 As such, personal jurisdiction or jurisdiction ratione personae of the Court is se-
verely constrained. This provision means that the ACH Protocol shows no greater commit-
ment to human rights protection than the provisions relating to the African Commission in 
the African Charter—it is a perpetuation of the old dispensation at least with regard to 
those states that have refused to submit to this optional jurisdiction, and a vast majority of 
them have not done so. It has been argued that “the restrictive access to the Court may un-
dermine the utility of the Court.”104 It has been noted, however, that is not unheard of that 
human rights systems require such optional declarations in cases of individual petitions. 
Robert Eno observes that, 
Prior to the coming into force of Protocol 11 to the European Convention, articles 25(1) 
and 46(1) required the High Contracting Parties to make separate declarations to al-
low the European Commission and the European Court respectively to entertain 
communications from individuals and NGOs. In the case of the Inter-American Court, 
individuals, groups of individuals and NGOs legally recognised by the OAS are only 
entitled to submit cases to the Inter-American Commission, which, if the case arises, 
at the end of the proceedings, transmits them to the Inter-American Court for judg-
ment. Individuals and NGOs do not have direct access to the Inter-American Court.105 
Even then, the Inter-American system makes it mandatory for the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights to refer cases of non-compliance to the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, and the European Commission is no longer in existence. In light of the lim-
ited protective mandate of the African Commission, ACH constitutes a milestone in the pro-
tection of human rights precisely because of the fact that for the first time as a truly judicial 
institution it would be enforcing human rights decisions in the African region in a legally 
binding manner. But, the ACH has had limited success in its first years of operation as an 
analysis of its jurisprudence indicates. 
The individual petitions restriction as well as the fact that the ACH is not strictly re-
quired to hear cases submitted to the African Commission106 do not reflect a serious com-
mitment of African States to provide an effective human rights protection regime since 
 
 101. Ouguergouz, supra note 28, at 114. 
 102. Juma, supra note 4, at 1. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Eno, supra note 57, at 230.  
 106. Rules of Court of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, R. 29(3)(c) (“The Court may 
also, if it deems it necessary, hear, under Rule 45 of the Rules, the individual or NGO that initiated 
a communication to the Commission pursuant to Article 55 of the Charter.”). 
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states parties to the ACH Protocol rarely sue each other in order to enforce human rights. 
Unsurprisingly, of the twenty-six states out of the fifty-four member states of the African 
Union that have ratified the Protocol, currently only five of them (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Ma-
lawi, Mali, and Tanzania) have made the declaration allowing individuals and NGOs to di-
rectly bring cases before the Court.107 This is a continuation of the “claw-back” mentality 
discussed earlier—the attempt to provide for human rights protection in letter only but nev-
er108 in any realistic manner. The restrictive access of individuals and NGOs to the ACH 
does little to protect the individuals from states that violate human rights but at the same 
time want to be party to human rights instruments as long as consequences are not assured. 
Also, such restrictive access “defies the object of internationalization and regionalization of 
human rights protection.”109 Moreover the limited access by individuals to the ACH in com-
parison to the access granted to the states undermines the “principle of equality of arms.”110 
This is because individuals are placed at a disadvantage by not having the same opportuni-
ties as the states to present their cases to the ACH.111 For this reason, Gina Bekker predicts 
that “it is unlikely that this newly-created body will fare any better than its predecessor in 
providing for the more effective protection of human rights and, in fact, given the constraints 
of who may petition the Court, it may do even worse.”112 
B. Jurisprudence of the African Court of Human Rights 
Between 2008 (when the ACH became ready to receive applications) and June 2012, the 
ACH received twenty-two applications and three requests for its advisory opinion.113 Twen-
ty-two applications is not a particularly impressive number, even without considering the 
result in those applications. But this is partly the inevitable result of the optional jurisdic-
tion of the ACH regarding individual petitions. This number may also be due to the fact that 
very few Africans or organizations even know of the existence of the ACH or of their rights. 
It is important to publish the list of states that have made the said declaration on the ACH’s 
website in order to offer better guidance to individuals and non-governmental organizations. 
 
 107. The African Court Gives a Lecture at Tumaini University, AFRICAN COURT OF HUMAN & PEOPLES’ 
RIGHTS, June 12, 2012, http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/news/latest-news/153-lecture-at-
makumira. 
 108. For example the only case of inter-state complaint before the African Commission has been D. R. 
Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda & Uganda, Comm. No. 227/99 (2003), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/227-99.html. 
 109. Juma, supra note 39, at 291. 
 110. Id. at 293. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Gina Bekker, The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Safeguarding the Interests of Afri-
can States, 51 J. AFR. L. 151, 172 (2007). 
 113. The African Court Gives a Lecture at Tumaini University, supra note 107. 
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Even then, the ACH has been criticized for its lack of expeditiousness. For example, it 
took over a year for this court to dispose of its first case,114 and it did so merely on the basis 
of a technicality without considering the merits. However, this court would not be the first 
one to suffer from such sluggishness. For example, the “Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights heard its first case a whole six years after its establishment in 1980, with a further 
four years before the second.”115 
This effect of the optional jurisdiction of the ACH relative to individual petitions has been 
shown in the jurisprudence of the ACH. For example, in Michelot Yogogombaye v. The Re-
public of Senegal,116 Mr. Michelot Yogogombaye, a Chadian national, brought a case against 
the Republic of Senegal, with a view to obtaining the suspension of ongoing proceedings in-
stituted by Senegal with the objective to charge, try and sentence Mr. Hissein Habré, a for-
mer Head of State of Chad, who was living as an aslyee in Senegal. Senegal raised a number 
of preliminary objections regarding the jurisdiction of the ACH and admissibility of the ap-
plication, asserting that it had not made any declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the 
ACH to deal with applications brought by individuals. The ACH held that because Senegal 
had not submitted the said declaration, there was no jurisdiction to hear cases instituted di-
rectly against Senegal if those cases were by individuals or non-governmental organizations. 
The ACH has gone on to deny jurisdiction in most of the cases that have come before it on 
similar grounds. It disposed of Youssef Ababou v. Morocco with little difficulty.117 The appli-
cant alleged that the Kingdom of Morocco had refused, and continued to refuse, to issue his 
documents to him, which included a national identity card and a passport. However, citing 
Article 3(1) of its Protocol, the court held that because “this is an application brought against 
a State which is not a member of the African Union, which has neither signed nor ratified 
the Protocol establishing the Court, the Court concludes that manifestly, it does not have the 
jurisdiction to hear the application.”118 In Efoua Mbozo’o Samuel v. Pan African Parlia-
ment,119 Samuel, domiciled in Yaoundé, Cameroon, brought before the ACH a case against 
the Pan African Parliament, alleging a breach of his contract of employment as well as a 
breach of Article 13 (a), (b) of the OAU Staff Regulations, and improper refusal to renew his 
contract. The ACH held that, 
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[I]t is clear that this application is exclusively grounded upon breach of employment 
contract in accordance with Article 13 (a) and (b) of the OAU Staff Regulations, for 
which the Court lacks jurisdiction in terms of Article 3 of the Protocol. This is therefore 
a case which, in terms of the OAU Staff Regulations, is within the competence of the 
Ad hoc Administrative Tribunal of the African Union. Further, in accordance with Ar-
ticle 29(1)(c) of its Protocol, the Court with jurisdiction over any appeals from this Ad 
hoc Administrative Tribunal is the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.120 
In Femi Falana v. The African Union,121 the applicant filed an application stating that af-
ter he had made several unsuccessful efforts to get the Government of Nigeria to deposit the 
declaration required under Article 34(6) of the ACH Protocol, he decided to file an applica-
tion against the AU as representative of its fifty three states, asking the ACH to find Article 
34(6) of the ACH Protocol inconsistent with Articles 1, 2, 7, 13, 26, and 66 of the African 
Charter. The applicant argued, among other things, that the requirement to make a declara-
tion to allow access to the ACH is a violation of his right to be heard guaranteed under Arti-
cle 7 of the African Charter. The Respondent argued that Article 34(6) the ACH Protocol re-
fers to a state and therefore submitted that the because the AU is not a state, it could not 
ratify the ACH Protocol, and that the ACH Protocol could not be interpreted in a manner 
which called upon a corporate entity to assume obligations on behalf of the state. The ACH 
denied the applicant access, simply holding that “pursuant to Articles 5(3) and 34(6) of the 
Protocol, read together, it does not have the jurisdiction to hear the Application filed by Mr. 
Femi Falana against the African Union.”122 While noting that as an international organiza-
tion, the AU has a legal personality separate from the legal personality of its member states, 
the ACH nevertheless held that individuals may not proceed against non-state entities such 
as the AU for a collective responsibility of states for violation of human rights, stating simply 
that only state parties may be sued before the ACH.123  
But the power of the ACH must not be overstated. Ultimately, even if the ACH issued le-
gally binding decisions on merit, if the AU and/or AU member states as such are not serious 
about implementing those decisions, the ACH will not be effective in bringing about a new 
era of human rights protection. An example is a case brought against Libya for provisional 
measures. While on the one hand in African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. 
The Great Socialist Libyan People’s Arab Jamahiriya,124 the ACH ordered that The Great 
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya immediately refrain from any action that would 
result in loss of life or violation of physical integrity of persons, which could be a breach of 
the provisions of the African Charter or of other international human rights instruments to 
which it is a party, and the AU adopted a resolution that sought a political process to the 
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resolution of the crisis, arguing “only a political solution will make it possible to promote, in 
a sustainable way, the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people for reform, democracy, 
good governance and the rule of law.”125 
A particularly important weakness of the new human rights regime is the continuation of 
the limited direct access of individuals and non-governmental organizations to the court. 
This restriction as well as the fact that the African Court is not strictly required to hear cas-
es submitted to the African Commission126 does not reflect a serious commitment on the part 
of African states to provide an effective human rights protection regime since states parties 
rarely sue each other in order to enforce human rights. This is a continuation of the “claw-
back” mentality discussed earlier—the attempt to provide for human rights protection in let-
ter only but never127 in any realistic manner. Article 30(f) of the Statute of the African Court 
provides that individuals have access to the court, subject to the provisions of Article 8 of the 
ACJH Protocol/Statute.128 Article 8 of ACJH Protocol/Statute provides that “[a]ny Member 
State may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification or ac-
cession, or at any time thereafter, make a declaration accepting the competence of the Court 
to receive cases under Article 30(f) involving a State which has not made such a declara-
tion.”129 These provisions are certainly a continuation of the status quo with respect to the 
protection of human rights. It means that African states are giving with one hand and tak-
ing back with the other. Yet, it is important to note that although twenty-six states out of 
the fifty-four member states of the AU have ratified the Protocol, currently only five of them 
(Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, and Tanzania) have made the declaration allowing in-
dividuals and NGOs to directly bring cases before the Court.130 Unfortunately, the ACJH 
Protocol/Statute does not provide for a transitional provision regarding those declarations 
which were already made under the Protocol for one year. All that the Statute of the ACJH 
provides for is continued validity of the ACH Protocol for one year or a period that the AU 
determines, in order to allow the ACH to “take the necessary measures for the transfer of its 
prerogatives, assets, rights and obligations to the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights.”131 In light of the explicit language of the Statute of the ACJH regarding the need for 
states parties to make declarations regarding individual petitions, it does not seem that 
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those declarations made under the ACH Protocol carry over to the ACJH Protocol/Statute, 
which means that the ACJH will have to start from scratch and will not benefit from earlier 
declarations made under the ACH Protocol. 
But, in the absence of an amendment to the ACH Protocol, could the ACH creatively nav-
igate this jurisdictional cul-de-sac, or does the language of the ACH Protocol essentially tie 
its hands in every instance? In Michelot Yogogombaye v. The Republic of Senegal,132 the sep-
arate opinion of Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz appears to be open to exploring that creativity. 
Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz opined that because there is no time limit provided for states par-
ties to the ACH Protocol to file or submit optional declaration regarding individual petitions, 
the prescription that every state party “shall” make a declaration does not have any real le-
gal effect.133 He also argued that in light of the travaux préparatoíres of the ACH Protocol, 
the filing of the declaration is optional. He stated that the filing of the optional declaration 
does not need to be done “before” the filing of an application because the ACH Protocol simp-
ly states that the declaration may be made “at the time of ratification or any time thereaf-
ter.” Accordingly, nothing in the ACH Protocol prevents a state party from making the dec-
laration after an application has been introduced against it. He also argued that if a state 
can accept the jurisdiction of the ACH by filing an optional declaration “at any time,” noth-
ing in the ACH Protocol prevents it from granting its consent after the introduction of the 
application, in a manner other than through an optional declaration. He noted that this pos-
sibility was codified, for example, in Article 62, paragraph 3, of the American Convention on 
Human Rights and Article 48 of the European Convention on Human Rights before this lat-
ter Convention was amended by Protocol 11.134 Accordingly, he argued that the provisions 
on jurisdiction regarding individual petitions must not be interpreted literally, but must be 
read in light of the object and purpose of the Protocol, and in particular, in light of Article 3 
entitled “Jurisdiction” of the Court. He went on to argue that because Article 3 provides in a 
general manner that “the jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all cases and disputes 
submitted to it” and it also provides that “in the event of dispute as to whether the Court has 
jurisdiction, the Court shall decide,” it lies with the ACH to determine the conditions for the 
validity of its seizure, and to do so only in the light of the principle of consent—the idea that 
state’s consent is part of state sovereignty.135 Accordingly, he argued, consent of the state 
party is the only condition for the ACH to exercise jurisdiction with regard to applications 
brought by individuals, and this consent may be expressed before the filing of an application 
against the state party, or it “may be expressed later, either formally through the filing of 
such a declaration, or informally or implicitly through forum prorogatum.”136 Forum pro-
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rogatum or “prorogation of competence,” he explained, may be understood as the acceptance 
of the jurisdiction of an international court by a state after the seizure of the court by anoth-
er state or an individual, and this is done either expressly or tacitly through decisive acts or 
unequivocal behavior. The decisive acts may consist in effective participation in the proceed-
ings, either by pleading on the merits, or by making findings on the merits or any other act 
implying a lack of objection against any future decision on the merits. He cited to the juris-
prudence of the International Court of Justice for the proposition that this could constitute 
tacit acceptance of jurisdiction, which cannot be revoked, by virtue of the doctrine of bona 
fide or estoppel.137 He concluded that the ACH does not therefore have to reject an applica-
tion until the state party has expressly objected to the jurisdiction of the ACH because it has 
not filed the declaration because there is always the possibility of a forum prorogatum.138  
But, the creativeness that Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz advocates would not even have to be 
invoked if the African Commission was willing to bring cases on behalf of individuals. The 
ACH Protocol provides that the African Commission may bring cases to ACH, but this is not 
mandatory: “The Commission may, pursuant to Rule 84(2) submit a communication before 
the Court against a State Party if a situation that, in its view, constitutes one of serious or 
massive violations of human rights as provided for under Article 58 of the African Charter, 
has come to its attention.”139 Apart from African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
v. The Great Socialist Libyan People’s Arab Jamahiriya,140 the African Commission has not 
shown much appetite to submit cases to the ACH. 
The African Commission’s proceedings against the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya alleged serious and massive violations of human rights guaranteed under the 
African Charter. Perhaps the African Commission did this only because of the gravity of the 
situation, but there is nothing in the ACH Protocol that limits the African Commission’s ac-
tion in this regard only to situations of extreme gravity. 
The role of the African Commission has not been rendered less important, redundant, or 
irrelevant because of the establishment of the ACH. The African Commission could play an 
important role if it was under the obligation to refer particular cases to the African Court for 
final disposition, if only to render them legally binding. The reason for this is that it could 
save the ACH time and resources. As Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz predicts, “in the not too dis-
tant future, the Court may be flooded with a whole range of applications which it would not 
be able to dispose of satisfactorily because of the limited material and human resources at its 
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disposal.”141 Unfortunately, the rules of procedure of the African Commission, Rules of Pro-
cedure of the ACH, and the ACH Protocol do not provide for this level of relationship and col-
laboration between the ACH and the African Commission. Rule 118(1) of the 2010 Rules of 
Procedure of the African Commission provides that, 
If the Commission has taken a decision with respect to a communication submitted 
under Articles 48, 49 or 55 of the Charter and considers that the State has not com-
plied or is unwilling to comply with its recommendations in respect of the communica-
tion within the period stated in Rule 112(2), it may submit the communication to the 
Court pursuant to Article 5 (1)(a) of the Protocol and inform the parties accordingly.142 
But in connection with the African Commission’s ability to bring petitions, the issue that 
arises is whether, if a case is declared inadmissible before the African Commission, the ap-
plicant may nevertheless bring it before the ACH. The Rules of Procedure of the African 
Commission give some indication as to what happens in this regard.143 The American Con-
vention on Human Rights seems to directly deal with this issue for it provides that only 
states parties and the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights shall have the right to 
submit cases to the court.144 
As an aside, the reasoning of the ACH has been more elaborate than the early jurispru-
dence of the African Commission. Elaborate and reasoned judgments lend credibility and 
legitimacy145 to the work of the ACH, a refreshing departure from earlier, more assertory 
decisions of the African Commission which were sometimes only a couple of paragraphs 
long, with very little indication of how the decision was reached.146 Judge Fatsah Ouguer-
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gouz, in particular, has insisted on the importance of providing reasoned judgments,147 ob-
serving that “[t]he integrity of the Court’s judicial function indeed requires that reasons be 
provided for decisions . . . so as to comply with the requirements of predictability and con-
sistency which are the essential ingredients that underpin the principle of legal certainty 
which should be guaranteed by the Court at all times.”148 The ACH Protocol also provides 
that “[r]easons shall be given for the judgment of the Court.”149 
The ACH also needs to demonstrate that it is not willing to simply abdicate its responsi-
bility by referring cases to other bodies such as the African Commission, which are not as 
empowered to deliver legally binding decisions and which can be inefficient in terms of time 
and resources, especially as the ACH does not meet on a regular basis as Judge Fatsah 
Ouguergouz pointed out in his dissent in Ekollo Moundi Alexandre v. Cameroon and Nige-
ria, in which the ACH transferred the matter to the African Commission.150 Article 6(3) al-
lows the ACH to consider the cases or transfer them to the African Commission. In light of 
the fact that the decisions of the African Commission do not have legally binding effect, it is 
important that the ACH develops criteria that lead most cases to be considered by this court 
rather than transferred to the African Commission if the ACH wants to project itself as the 
harbinger of a new dispensation in human rights protection across the continent and that it 
is no longer business as usual. Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz appropriately observed that  
 In deciding not to rule on the merits of a case over which it has jurisdiction, the Af-
rican Court could however be opening the door to a veritable deniable of justice; the re-
ferral of the case to the Commission for determination on the merits would not suffice 
to forestall such a denial of justice since only the Court does have powers of a judicial 
nature.151  
It has been argued that Article 6(3) of the ACH Protocol could be used by the ACH to 
“side-step cases viewed as politically inconvenient.152 
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Other criticisms of the ACH are more structural. The ACH has only sixteen judges153 for 
a continent of about a billion people. Europe and Africa have just about the same popula-
tion.154 A developing continent might have more human rights problems that would necessi-
tate the adoption of appropriate enforcement resources. By comparison, the European Court 
of Human Rights consists of a number of judges “equal to that of the High Contracting Par-
ties.”155 In the case of Africa, that number would be fifty-three. The statute provides, though, 
that “[u]pon recommendation of the Court, the Assembly, may, review the number of Judg-
es.”156 
C. The African Court of Human Rights and Justice 
It is important to first note that the proposed ACJH would merge the Court of Justice of 
the Union or the AU Court and the ACH. The ACJ is a creature of the Constitutive Act.157 
To operationalize this ACJ, the African Union adopted the Protocol of the Court of Justice of 
the African Union on July 11, 2003. Subsequently, however, the African Union adopted158 
the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJH Proto-
col/Statute), to merge the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Court of 
Justice of Union into a single court—the ACJH.159 The ACJH has not yet come into exist-
ence because the mandatory fifteen ratifications of the ACJH Protocol/Statute to enter into 
force have not been reached. But the provisions of the ACJH can be analyzed even before the 
ACJH becomes operational. 
To ensure a seamless transition from the ACH to the ACJH, when the ACJH Proto-
col/Statute becomes operational any cases pending before the ACH which shall not have 
been concluded before the entry into force of the ACJH Protocol/Statute shall be transferred 
to the Human Rights Section of the ACJH.160 Additionally, the ACH Protocol will remain in 
force for a transitional period not exceeding one year or any other period determined by the 
African Union Assembly, after entry into force of the ACJH Protocol/Statute, which would 
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enable the enable the ACH to take the necessary measures for the transfer of its preroga-
tives, assets, rights and obligations to the ACJH.161 The ACJH will have both a General Af-
fairs Section and a Human Rights Section.162 What is not so clear is whether these transi-
tional provisions also concern declarations regarding individual petitions already made 
under ACH Protocol. All that the ACJH Protocol/Statute provides for is the continued validi-
ty of the ACH Protocol for one year or a period that the AU determines, in order to allow the 
ACH to “take the necessary measures for the transfer of its prerogatives, assets, rights and 
obligations to the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.”163 In light of the explicit lan-
guage of the ACJH Protocol/Statute regarding the need for states parties to make declara-
tions regarding individual petitions, it does not seem that those declarations made under the 
ACH Protocol remain effective under the ACJH Protocol/Statute, which means that the 
ACJHR will have to start over and will not benefit from earlier declarations made under the 
ACH Protocol. 
The merged court has certain advantages. First, this helps to avoid duplication or prolif-
eration of courts and it promotes efficiency.164 Second, a “single court would avoid splitting of 
resources, both human and financial, towards maintaining two courts.”165 The experience of 
the African Commission more than demonstrates the need for doing this. The “African 
Commission, face[s] severe underfunding and understaffing problems, which affect their ef-
fectiveness,”166and “many African countries seem unwilling or unable to pay in a time their 
dues to the regional organisation.”167 Third, the merger sends a signal that economic and 
other matters are not being prioritized over human rights concerns but that all of these is-
sues are of equal weight and importance. Fourth, the “synergy between political and eco-
nomic matters on the one hand, and human rights, on the other, necessitates an integrated 
court.”168 But the counterpoint to this could be that economic issues and human rights are 
“increasingly acknowledged as highly specialised fields,”169 and that a merger could in fact 
risk the relegation of human rights issues to the periphery.170 Fifth, the merger helps to 
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avoid the “serious risk of conflicting jurisprudence, as the same rules of law might be given 
different interpretations in different cases. . .the AU Constitutive Act, which the Court of 
Justice is designated to interpret, encompasses human rights issues.”171 
In spite of all of these advantages, “[n]ow that one of the twin African courts is . . . func-
tional . . .vested interests might make submerging of the human rights Court into the Court 
of Justice very difficult even though it could be the most pragmatic thing to do.”172 It is 
therefore suggested that in order not to frustrate 
[L]egitimate expectation of those judges and the countries which had nominated 
them. . .[a] more practical way of dealing with the serving judges would have been to 
provide that irrespective of the date of entry into force of the protocol on the integrated 
court, election of judges thereto will not take place until the 2 year terms of four of the 
initial judges of the human rights court have lapsed.173 
Of greater concern, however, is that the problems associated with the ACH are perpetu-
ated under the ACJH. For example, while individuals can bring petitions for human rights 
violations against states,174 this is only possible if the individual’s state of nationality has 
previously made a declaration accepting the competence of the ACJH to receive such cas-
es.175 The critique of the ACH Protocol in regard to individual petitions applies equally here 
as well. This means that although the ACJH Protocol/Statute is progressive in other re-
spects, especially with regard to enforcement of the ACJH’s judgments, adopting the ap-
proaches of the European Union,176 ultimately the ACJH does not advance human rights 
protection far enough. 
While the ACJH Protocol/Statute provides that the ACJH will be complementary to the 
work of the African Commission,177 the ACJH Protocol/Statute appears to have lost “some 
key complementarity provisions” enshrined in the ACH Protocol.178 For example, the ACH 
Protocol made provisions for the court to “transfer cases it deemed necessary to the Commis-
sion.”179 For practical reasons, it is important that the ACJH strengthens, rather than un-
dermines, the African Commission precisely because of “the limited resources, human and 
material, which have been available to the Commission, as it would most probably be the 
case with the Court,”180 unless it appears that the African Commission is unwilling to coop-
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erate. Additionally, “the [ACJH] Protocol has also failed to clearly demarcate the responsibil-
ities and institutional relations between the Court and African Commission in their conten-
tious and advisory jurisdictions.”181 
Since the ACJH is not only concerned with human rights but has a general mandate as 
well, it should have included criminal matters such as genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes within its material jurisdiction or jurisdiction ratione materiae. This could 
be helpful for nations that are still transitioning from conflicts, especially in the wake of Af-
rican criticism of the International Criminal Court as being an overly euro-centric court.182 
While the ACJH Protocol/Statute provides that the ACJH shall be “impartial and inde-
pendent,” it is not clear how it will be able to effectuate these critically important qualities. 
For example, Article 5(1) of the ACJH Protocol/Statute provides that each state party to the 
ACJH Protocol/Statute may submit candidates for the post of judge of the Court. The fact 
that the terms of office are limited and they are political appointees may inject politics into 
the process and may compromise competence in spite of the fact that the statute provides 
that judges shall be persons recognized for their “competence and experience in internation-
al law and/or, human rights.”183 Nowhere in the ACJH Statute does it provide for independ-
ent applications by other potentially suitable candidates. A close reading of ACJH Proto-
col/Statute suggests that candidates must be submitted and endorsed only by their 
respective states of nationality.184 This could potentially exclude the more qualified ACJH 
candidates from competing for positions on the ACJH, particularly those who have been crit-
ical of their respective governments. That could easily be the reason that they are not sub-
mitted by their state of nationality.185 The statute should have provided for the possibility of 
a state party nominating qualified persons from other contracting state parties to the ACJH 
Protocol/Statute. The American Convention of Human Rights is instructive in this regard. It 
provides that “[e]ach of the States Parties may propose up to three candidates, nationals of 
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the state that proposes them or of any other member state of the Organization of American 
States.”186 
With regard to the independence of the judges, the ACJH Protocol/Statute provides that 
“[i]n the performance of the judicial functions and duties, the Court and its Judges shall not 
be subject to the direction or control of any person or body.”187 While this provision is basical-
ly the same as that in the European Convention on Human Rights,188 ultimately the en-
forcement of the decisions of the Court depend on the political process189 which, in light of 
the experience of the African Commission, can be slow, secretive and frustrating.190 But the 
ACJH will be able to render its judgments in open court.191 
Articles 50 and 51 of the ACJH Protocol/Statute also make provisions for states parties 
and organs of the AU to intervene in the proceedings of the ACJH interpreting the Constitu-
tive Act or treaties, in which they are not parties.192 Individuals and NGOs, however, are 
excluded from exercising similar rights and cannot intervene even if the case affects them in 
one way or another.193 
The ACJH Protocol/Statute must be credited for a number of progressive provisions. It 
provides, for example, that “[w]here a party has failed to comply with a judgment, the Court 
shall refer the matter to the Assembly, which shall decide upon measures to be taken to give 
effect to that judgment,”194 and that “[t]he Assembly [of Heads of State of the African Union] 
may impose sanctions by virtue of paragraph 2 of Article 23 of the Constitutive Act.”195 Arti-
cle 23(2) of the Constitutive Act provides that “any Member State that fails to comply with 
the decisions and policies of the Union may be subjected to other sanctions, such as the de-
nial of transport and communications links with other Member States, and other measures 
of a political and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly,” and that the ACJH 
can submit an annual report to the Assembly of Heads of State of the African Union in 
which it is expected to specify the cases in which a party has not complied with the judg-
ments of this court.196 However, save for a few cases,197 the AU’s record does not reflect seri-
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ous, concerted and consistent commitment to the application of such sanctions to noncompli-
ant African member states. As such, while a more publicized approach will result in more 
naming and shaming which can help advance enforcement efforts somewhat more than was 
previously the case under the African Commission,198 this too can only be effective depend-
ing on the degree to which African states actually care about shame and criticism. In sum, 
although the documents regarding the legal effect of the African Courts are impressive, they 
ultimately may not amount to more than paper tigers. 
V.  Transforming Political, Economic, and Social Context in Africa  
The promotion and protection of human rights cannot take place in isolation or in a vacu-
um. Any regional system can have only as much human rights protection as the political and 
economic realities in that region permit. Indeed, “[t]here is no future for the human rights 
movement in Africa unless it can secure domestic ideological, financial, and moral support 
from interested constituencies.”199 Significant financial resources are necessary to have ef-
fective human rights enforcement institutions. So, perhaps a multi-faceted approach is im-
perative. This calls for the promotion and acceleration of transformation of socio-political 
conditions in Africa. To this end, at the turn of the Millennium the international community 
applauded and showcased each democratic improvement in Africa such as Botswana, South 
Africa, Senegal, and Uganda, among others, as examples for the rest of Africa.200 This needs 
to be done consistently. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the world’s attention shifted 
to the Middle East, and Africa was mostly relevant only to the extent that it was strategical-
ly important in the fight against global terrorism. But Africa’s concerns went well beyond 
that. When the global economic recession arrived in 2008, the interest in Africa receded even 
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further. This is as true of the United Nations as it is true of the most consequential global 
actors, such as the United States. 
But, the challenge goes first to Africans and the AU. The AU should continue to improve 
the political, socio-economic conditions in Africa, which are prerequisites for the full enjoy-
ment of human rights in the respective member states of the AU. The rest of the world can 
only do so much for Africa. The AU should stand ever more firmly against regimes that as-
sume power by extra-constitutional means as has happened recently in a few countries.201 
Over time, a new culture will emerge that will provide a solid foundation for the promotion 
and protection of human rights. It is remarkable that in “the 45 years to 2001, 80 successful 
and 108 unsuccessful coups took place in Africa.”202 The Constitutive Act provides for the 
suspension of the membership of such regimes from participation in the activities of the un-
ion.203 But this provision has been inconsistently enforced. 
In addition, the AU must be seen to make a real difference in the lives of the citizens of 
the individual countries. More than ever, it is imperative for the AU to work towards mean-
ingful economic integration that has succeeded in other regions such as the European Union. 
It is not enough for the AU to replicate human rights instruments of the European Union 
without working to change the conditions on the ground that supports the realization of such 
instruments. The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community recognizes that 
“economic integration of the Continent is a pre-requisite for the realization of the objectives 
of the OAU.”204 It establishes praiseworthy objectives including the “liberalisation of trade 
through the abolition, among Member States, of Customs Duties levied on imports and ex-
ports and the abolition, among Member States of Non-Tariff Barriers in order to establish a 
free trade area at the level of each regional economic community,”205 “adoption of a common 
trade policy vis-à-vis third States,”206 “establishment of a common market,”207 and “gradual 
removal, among Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services 
and capital and the right of residence and establishment.”208 But it is now almost twenty 
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years since the adoption of this treaty and yet there is very little to show in terms of the real-
ization of these noble objectives. But adopting international treaties must have consequenc-
es. Countries must be ready to help investors and to open their doors and set certain conti-
nental trade rules that are conducive to continent-wide trade. 
VI.  Recommendations and Conclusion 
It is important for African leaders to continue to cultivate a serious commitment to the 
enforcement of human rights. The African region has gone a long way in articulating human 
rights norms, evidenced by the adoption of the Constitutive Act which explicitly commits the 
political institutions to human rights and creates new institutions for the enforcement of 
human rights protections. However, it is still important for ACH Protocol as well as the 
ACJH Protocol/Statute to provide direct individual access to these human rights enforce-
ment institutions. The requirement that state parties should first make a declaration per-
mitting individual or NGO petitions should be eliminated. Some commentators have sug-
gested that this requirement, which essentially is an opt-in provision, should be replaced 
with a provision that permits states parties “to opt out of accepting the otherwise automatic 
jurisdiction of the Court over individual and NGO petitions.”209 Also, there should be no re-
quirements for NGOs to first have observer status before they can present petitions to the 
ACJH or ACH. As Udombana argues in respect to the African Commission, “the require-
ment of obtaining ‘observer status’ before the Commission potentially implies a longer, more 
expensive process that few small NGOs are likely to be able to undertake.”210 
Yet, even if individuals had direct access to African human rights enforcement institu-
tions, the reality in Africa is that there is still a need to develop a culture of commitment to 
respect for human rights. This has relevance for the enforcement of human rights generally. 
It has been noted that ultimately, the future of the ACH “is dependent on the will of the Af-
rican states,”211 among others. It seems a “logical, but not necessarily correct, argument . . . 
that if the experiment has succeeded in Europe, it can also prosper in Africa. This is proba-
bly the reason why Africa’s integration agenda is closely patterned after the European mod-
el.”212 But in fact, “mere emulation of the European experiment may not work in Africa.”213 
European “countries were motivated to unify because of the tragic and costly war, the fear of 
Nazi Germany, and the apprehension of communist expansion. In contrast, Africa’s current 
movement has more to do with the challenges resulting from globalization than the euphoria 
of unity.”214 As Udombana puts it, Africa “cannot transplant the European model of integra-
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tion, including the paraphernalia of courts and other institutions, to Africa and expect it to 
flourish without carefully tailoring it to the specific needs of the region.” Those needs include 
the need to create sufficient political, economic and social conditions that would support the 
rule of law, without which new judicial institutions would be useless. Those conditions in-
clude creating democratic governance across African states as well as improved economic 
conditions. 
It is also important to adopt a proper and realistic attitude. The ACH and the ACJH can-
not be expected at their inception to perform at the same level as the regional human rights 
courts in the Inter-American system or the European Union. In any event, the ACH or 
ACJH inevitably serve states that are still developing from the standpoint of commitment to 
the rule of law and available economic and human resources. The challenges that these 
courts face are unique because of the diverse cultures, political heterogeneity and enormous 
geographical space across the African continent. 
There is also a need to educate Africans about the ACH or ACJH. Education is power. 
Unless ACH or ACJH is popularized in the African consciousness it will remain at the pe-
riphery of peoples’ lives. NGOs in various countries can play a significant role in this regard. 
But lawyers and law schools should also take an active part in popularizing the ACH or 
ACJH. 
The ACH’s or ACJH’s jurisdiction should be expanded to include criminal matters such 
as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Many African countries still have is-
sues of grave violations of human rights that also have a criminal component that cannot be 
left to a single global court such as the International Court of Justice. 
In light of the fact that the African Commission has only discretionary powers to refer a 
case to the ACH/ACJH, the reluctance of the African Commission to refer cases of noncom-
pliance to the ACH, as well as the fact that a hierarchical order between the African Com-
mission and the African Court is not intended, perhaps it is time to face the truth that the 
African Commission has served its purpose and should now merge the African Commission 
with the ACH or replace it with a chamber of the ACH, which would open the possibility of 
cases reaching a grand chamber of the ACH. This would also put the scant human and fi-
nancial resources available to the African Commission to better use. This recommendation is 
reinforced by the recognition that it appears that the African Commission fears that “it will 
lose all importance next to a strong court, since it is paid little attention as it is,”215 and an 
admission that “co-operation between the Commission and the Court is likely to prove diffi-
cult in practice.”216 In these circumstances, it would be better to abandon the principle of 
complementarity between the ACJHR/ACH and the African Commission. 
Ultimately, for these new mechanisms to succeed it will be necessary for African States to 
commit themselves to provide “adequate financial and human resources. It will need proper 
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quarters and a well-trained staff, modern office equipment and the support of competent 
administrative personnel.”217 
It is important that the relationship between the various judicial and quasi-judicial insti-
tutions is as smooth and seamless as possible to avoid not only conflicts of jurisdiction but 
also wastage of time and other resources through overlapping jurisdictions and duplication. 
For example, the relation of the ACJH to the Court of Justice of the African Economic Com-
munity (AEC) is not a clear one.218 It is noteworthy that the ACJH Protocol/Statute does not 
spell out the relationship between the AEC and ACJH. 
In conclusion, if the AU ends at instituting new judicial institutions, without transform-
ing the underlying normative frameworks or procedural bottle-necks such as restricting di-
rect access to individuals or NGOs to such institutions, as well as working to improve condi-
tions on the ground that foster the promotion and protection of human rights, there will be 
no new human rights dispensation. 
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